Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing:
Defining the Boundary
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act' has eliminated most
overt price-fixing arrangements. In order to avoid sanctions under
this law, firms wishing to engage in collusive, 2 anticompetitive
practices are forced to enter into secret agreements to fix prices.3
The detection of these covert agreements has become the central
focus of section 1 enforcement. 4 Direct evidence of such agreements is difficult to obtain, however, and courts must often rely on
indirect or circumstantial evidence of conspiracies to fix prices.
Frequently, an important factor in establishing the existence of
such a conspiracy is similar conduct by rival firms that suggests
they are attempting to set prices or carve up the market for a particular product.5 Such "conscious parallelism" by itself does not
constitute concerted action in violation of the Sherman Act,' however, and courts have disagreed over what additional evidence
("plus factors") must be produced in order to permit a trier of fact
to infer the existence of a price-fixing agreement. 7
1 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
2 Professor, now Judge, Richard Posner noted the difference between a cartel and a
collusive arrangement: "Although sometimes the term 'cartel' is used to refer to any collusive arrangement, it is more often limited to the kind of formal, above-board agreement
among firms to limit their competition that one finds in markets, here and abroad, not subject to the Sherman Act." RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 39

(1976). The most notable example of an overt cartel is the Organization of Petroleum Ex-

porting Countries (OPEC).
I Posner, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare: A Reply to Professor Markovits, 28 STAN. L. REV. 903, 904 (1970).
4 Posner argues that this focus has "virtually emptied [the rule against price fixing] of
any economic content, to become in effect a branch of the criminal law of conspiracies and
attempts." Id.
5 See Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199, 202

(3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
0

See, e.g., Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541

(1954).
7 Compare In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 634, 637 (5th Cir. 1981) (allowing the inference of conspiracy from parallel conduct and evidence of opportunity to
conspire), cert. dismissed sub nom. Lyman Lamb v. Weyerhauser, 462 U.S. 1125 (1983),
with Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 463 (7th Cir. 1981)

(holding that parallel conduct plus opportunity to conspire did not permit the inference of
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The plus factor most often considered by courts in determining whether parallel behavior is the result of an agreement is the
business-justifications test. Under this test, a price-fixing agreement may be inferred from parallel conduct if firms cannot show
legitimate independent business reasons for engaging in such practices.8 Once conscious parallelism sufficient to establish an agreement has been found, the practices are deemed illegal per se, without an inquiry into whether the practices are actually anticompetitive.9
Commentators, on the other hand, including Richard Posner
and Donald Turner, have argued that the courts' emphasis on establishing the existence of an agreement is improper.10 Although
Posner and Turner employ different economic analyses, both conclude that parallel practices violate the Sherman Act if, and only
if, they have anticompetitive effects." Both advocate an inquiry-similar to the rule of reason12-into the economic effects of
firms' parallel behavior without a separate inquiry into the existence of anagreement among firms not to compete. 13
This comment argues that both the courts' treatment of inferred agreements as per se illegal and Posner's and Turner's ruleof-reason inquiries for anticompetitive effects are inadequate and
contrary to section 1, which requires that there be both an agreement and a restraint of trade.' 4 Part I of the comment examines
the economics of cartelization and conspiracies to restrain trade
and outlines the differing approaches to the subject suggested by
Turner and Posner. Part II explores the judicial treatment of parallel behavior.
In Part III, the comment argues that findings of both an

conspiracy when rebutted by evidence that the adoption of the parallel conduct was supported by independent business justifications), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982).
8 See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 310 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. granted sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 105 S. Ct. 1863
(1985); Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 465 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982); In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. dismissed sub nom. Lyman Lamb v. Weyerhauser, 462 U.S. 1125 (1983). But see
Ambook Enters. v. Time Inc., 612 F.2d 604, 618 n.23 (2d Cir. 1979) (questioning the parties'
assumption that per se rule applied), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 914 (1980).
:o See infra notes 44-48, 55-57 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 34-66 and accompanying text.
1 Under the rule of reason, a court must find that a practice is anticompetitive in effect
before it condemns the practice under the Sherman Act. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
13 See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
'4 See supra note 1.
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agreement and anticompetitive conduct are required in order to establish a violation of section 1. Thus, parallel conduct found to
constitute an agreement under the business-justifications test
should not be treated as per se illegal because, unlike many overt
price-fixing agreements, such conduct is not anticompetitive on its
face. Conversely, condemning parallel activity under a rule of reason inquiry without regard to the existence of an agreement exposes firms to liability for otherwise legitimate conduct solely because the conduct has an adverse impact on competition. Under
such a standard, firms would be liable under section 1 not because
their conduct, standing alone, is anticompetitive, but because the
interaction of the conduct of several firms has an adverse impact
on competition. Such an effect cannot properly be brought within
the scope of section 1. In order to find a violation of section 1,
therefore, courts should first determine, using the business-justifications test, whether there is an agreement, and should then analyze the parallel conduct under the rule-of-reason inquiry to determine whether the practices have anticompetitive effects.
I.

ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO CARTELS, CONSPIRACIES, AND
CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM

In a competitive market, no firm acting alone can affect the
market price of a commodity. 15 Firms act as price-takers and maximize profits by increasing their output until the cost of the last
unit sold (the marginal cost of production) equals the market
price.1 6 By forming a cartel, however, firms can affect the market
price. 7 Cartels maximize the profits of their members by reducing
total output and setting prices well above marginal cost,'8 thus
achieving a market price that is higher than the price that would
prevail if the market were competitive."
15

'6

EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONoMIcs 20 n.2 (3d ed. 1979).

R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 241.
& F. EASTERBROOK,

27 R. POSNER

ANTITRUST- CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER

MATERIALS 1065 (2d ed. 1981).
18 See JAMES KOCH, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PRICES
19

420-22 (2d ed. 1980).
R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 17, at 1064-65. The probability of effective

collusion is not the same for all markets. Several market factors have been identified that
facilitate collusion; these include product homogeneity, inelastic product demand, concentration of economic power, fewness of firms, and the conviviality of interfirm relationships.
See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 199227 (2d ed. 1980); Hay & Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J.L.
& ECON. 13, 14-16 (1974). The Depression-era cigarette industry presents a good example of
a market ripe for collusion. It was concentrated and dominated by three powerful manufacturers. Moreover, the "Big Three" had cozy business relations. For example, in order to
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The monopoly prices 20 resulting from cartelization have two
principal effects. First, wealth is redistributed from consumers to
participants in the price-fixing arrangement. 2 While this outcome
is normatively neutral from an economic perspective,2 2 it is undesirable if society favors consumers over producers. Second, monopoly prices reduce the quantity of the good supplied because some
purchasers, facing a higher price, buy less desirable substitute
products.23 These consumers are thus worse off to the extent that
the substitute is inferior to the monopolized good, while producers
are better off, despite the foregone sales, only because they collect
monopoly profits.2 4 The resulting inefficient utilization of resources
25
represents a deadweight loss to society.
Formal cartels are inherently unstable. Members have an incentive to cheat on the cartel by pricing below the monopoly price.
By reducing price, a member can capture profits at the expense of
other members, so long as the rest of the cartel adheres to the monopoly price.2 6 Cartels must therefore develop enforcement mechanisms that protect against such cheating; detection of cheating and
enforcement of the cartel price are likely to be imperfect, however,
if there are many member firms or if information about market
transactions is difficult to obtain. Cheating tends eventually to
drive cartel prices back to the competitive level.
Many economists suggest, however, that in an oligopolistic

keep production costs down, each refrained from buying raw tobacco grades in which others
had a special interest. Thus, even during a period of falling demand, the three, apparently
through very informal collusion, were able to earn high profits. See American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 798-808 (1946).
20 The monopoly price is determined by finding the point at which the cartel marginal
cost curve (the horizontal sum of the marginal cost curves of the individual firms, if input
prices do not increase as the cartel is formed) intersects with the market marginal revenue
curve. The price along the demand curve at that output level is the joint-maximizing or
monopoly price. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 15, at 347-48.
" See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 17, at 4-11; F. SCHERER, supra note 19,
at 14-20.
22 The conclusion of neutrality assumes that everyone places the same value on the last
additional dollar received or spent. Posner argues that monopoly profits will also be converted into social costs, i.e., deadweight loss, because a firm will expend real resources in
order to become a monopolist or gain admission to a cartel. Through this "competitive"
process, firms might spend resources just equal at the margin to the amount of expected
monopoly profits. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 11-12.
23

Id. at 242.

Id.
For a general discussion, see J. KOCH, supra note 18, at 72-81.
26 Id. at 420-22.
24

2"

27

GEORGE STIGLER,

ed. 1983).

A Theory of Oligopoly, in THE

ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY

42-43 (2d
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market-one that has only a few producers-a formal agreement is
not necessary for rival firms to set a monopoly price, or at least a
price that is significantly greater than the competitive level. 28 Even
though a market may consist of several firms, each may realize
that its business decisions interact with those made by other
firms. 29 One variant of this interdependence theory-known as monopolistic competition-suggests that firms fully recognize the implications of interdependence and realize that they need not be
passive price-takers.3 0 As a result, they will set prices at the monopoly level, knowing that price cuts will merely erode industry,
3 1
and hence individual, profits.
The theory of monopolistic competition has profound implications for section 1 enforcement. It suggests that firms, merely by
recognizing their interdependence and without the need for formal
32
agreement, may achieve the prohibited ends of a formal cartel.
Since much of American industry conforms to the oligopoly model,
present antitrust law thus may be incapable of dealing with a per33
vasive market problem.
Professor Donald Turner, embracing the theory of monopolistic competition, has argued that oligopolists who achieve a monopoly price by considering the probable reaction of others in the market, and "without more in the way of 'agreement' than is found in
'conscious parallelism,' should not be held unlawful conspirators
28 PETER ASCH, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND ANTITRUST POLICY
29

41-70 (rev. ed. 1983).

Id.

Id. at 59. Edward Chamberlin, the first proponent of this theory, observed that:
[f]or one competitor to take into account the alterations of policy which he forces upon
the other is simply for him to consider the indirect consequences of his own acts. Let
each seller, then, in seeking to maximize his profit, reflect well, and look to the total
consequences of his move. He must consider not merely what his competitor is doing
now, but also what he will be forced to do in the light of the change which he himself is
contemplating.
EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 47 (8th ed. 1962) (footnote omitted).
81 P. ASCH, supra note 28, at 59. Only "when the individual's influence upon the price
becomes so small that he neglects it" will price fall to the competitive level. E. CHAMBERLIN,
supra note 30, at 48.
80

32 As Chamberlin explained:

This interdependence must, however, be interpreted with care, for, in the nature of the
case, when there are only two or a few sellers, their fortunes are not independent.
There can be no actual, or tacit, agreement-that is all. Each is forced by the situation
itself to take into account the policy of his rival in determining his own, and this cannot be construed as a "tacit agreement" between the two.
E. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 30, at 31 (second emphasis added).
88 See Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REV. 743, 755 (1950).

Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing

1985]

under the Sherman Act. ' 34 Turner, reflecting the general approach
of the "Harvard School, ' 35 notes that "[a]s a legal conclusion, this

could be stated in either of two ways: (1) there is no violation because there is no 'agreement;' or (2) there is no violation because,
although there is 'agreement,' 36
the agreement cannot properly be
called an unlawful'agreement.

From this premise, Turner concludes that parallel conduct
only indicates illegal behavior if all of the firms' conduct cannot be
37
explained by consciously parallel behavior and oligopoly pricing.
Turner would not, for example, condemn pure parallel-pricing activity (e.g., price leadership), 8 but he would proscribe the adoption
of "rigid zone pricing" (e.g., a delivered-price scheme). 39 In part,
this distinction rests on a prudential argument that to attack "natural" oligopolistic pricing behavior would require the courts to engage in regulatory "rate-setting" functions; 40 "artificial" pricing
structures, by contrast, can be remedied simply by an injunction.41
The distinction also rests on the belief "that oligopoly price behavior can be described as individual behavior-rational individual
decisions in the light of relevant economic facts-as well as it can
be described by 'agreement.' ",42 These "relevant economic facts"
include the likely response of other oligopolists to a competitor's
pricing decisions.43
Turner suggests that parallel behavior should not be charac34 Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 671 (1962).
35

See, e.g.,

LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST

359 (1977); Rahl,

supra note 33, at 755-56.
36 Turner, supra note 34, at 671.
37 Id. at
38

672.
Id. at 681.

3
Id. at 673-75. Under a delivered-price system, a uniform price is charged each buyer
regardless of the distance from the production source. F. SCHERER, supra note 19, at 326; see
also infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
10 If, for example, defendants were convicted of price fixing based only on evidence of
parallel-pricing practices, the court could not effectively enjoin an "agreement" because,
under Turner's view of economics, the parties priced in a "profit-maximizing" way given all
the factors in the market. Turner, supra note 34, at 666. An injunction, to be effective,
would necessarily tell defendants: "'Always increase your output to the point where marginal cost. . . equals the price that can be obtained; or alternatively, always lower your price
to the point where it equals marginal cost.'" Id. at 670. In order to eliminate monopoly
profits, the court's analysis would have to "closely resemble what in theory is imposed by
public-utility regulation," causing immense practical problems for the courts. Id.
41 Id. at 666.
42 Id.

43 Id.

at 673.
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terized as an agreement prohibited under section 1;14 rather, oligopolistic pricing is more appropriately attacked as a violation of the
prohibition in section 2 5 of monopolization or attempts to monopolize, which does not require proof of an agreement.46 A parallel
practice should thus be condemned only if it "protects or augments market power or extends it into other markets. '47 Such
treatment of parallel behavior would achieve what Turner considers to be the important goal of bringing "the law on oligopolists'
conduct more or less in line with the law on monopolists' conduct."4 8
Professor, now Judge, Richard Posner has suggested a different approach to conscious parallelism, reflecting the views of "Chicago School" economists on oligopoly theory. Posner states that
"[t]he relationship between the level of concentration in a market
and the probability that pricing in that market will be noncompetitive can be elucidated in simpler and more fruitful terms than interdependence: in terms of the theory of cartels. ' 49 He suggests
that absent agreement, firms, even in an oligopolistic market, will
act as rivals and set price and output at competitive rather than
monopoly levels.5 Under this view, oligopoly is a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition for successful price fixing. 51 From this basic premise, Posner argues that "voluntary actions by the sellers are
necessary to translate the bare condition of an oligopoly market
into a situation of noncompetitive pricing. ' 52 Such voluntary action, whether in the form of express or tacit collusion, constitutes
concerted action and thus falls within the ambit of section 1.5 3 Posner also argues that parallel behavior can be useful circumstantial
,evidence of a formal, but concealed, cartel. When the actions of a

" Turner also suggests defining "agreement" under the Sherman Act in terms of "interdependence of decisions" because the courts have gone "beyond the boundaries of explicit, verbally communicated assent to a common course of action." Id. at 683.
4- 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (making it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire. . . to monopolize any part of. . . trade or commerce").
46 Turner, supra note 34, at 682; see also Note, Conscious Parallelismand the Sherman Act: An Analysis and a Proposal, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1241 (1977) ("[C]onscious
parallelism among the largest firms in a highly concentrated industry shall constitute prima
facie evidence of a [Sherman Act § 2] conspiracy to monopolize.").
41 Turner, supra note 34, at 682.
48

Id.

'9 Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
1562, 1569 (1969) (footnote omitted).
:0 Id. at 1566-69.
1 Id. at 1571-74.
5:2Id.

at 1575.

3'Id. at 1576-78.
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formal cartel are completely concealed, however, the observable
behavior of the cartel's members is consistent with a hypothesis of
tacit collusion. Thus, a4 submerged cartel should be treated as a
5
form of tacit collusion.
In Posner's view, the "biggest problem in applying section 1
. . . to tacit collusion is that of proof: How can the existence of
noncompetitive pricing be established without any proof of acts of
agreement, implementation, or enforcement?" 55 He suggests a twostep approach to this evidentiary problem: first, economic evidence
should be examined to identify "markets in which conditions are
propitious for the emergence of collusion"; second, market evidence should be examined to determine whether collusion in fact
exists.56 This technique would avoid the need for extensive, costly
searches for "hot-document" evidence of agreement-what he calls
the 'cops-and-robbers' approach to price-fixing that has hereto57
fore dominated the law."
One drawback in Posner's two-step approach is that it would
require a "ramble through the wilds of economic theory". ' ' in every
case. Once parallel conduct is shown, litigants would be required to
produce massive and often ambiguous economic evidence and to
spend large sums on expert interpretation of such evidence. 9

Id. at 1575.
Id. at 1578.
" R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 55. Conditions favorable to collusion include: (1) concentration of sellers; (2) lack of a fringe of small sellers; (3) inelastic demand at the competitive
price; (4) lengthy time required for new entry into the market; (5) many customers; (6) a
standardized product; (7) the principal firms sell at the same level in the chain of distribution; (8) emphasis on price competition over other forms of competition; (9) a high ratio of
fixed to variable costs of production; (10) static or declining demand over time; (11) award
of business on the basis of sealed bids; (12) a poor antitrust record for the industry. Id. at
55-62.
Evidence of collusive behavior includes: (1) fixed relative market shares; (2) price discrimination; (3) exchanges of price information; (4) regional price variations; (5) identical
bids; (6) price, output, and capacity changes at the formation of a cartel; (7) industry-wide
resale price maintenance; (8) declining market shares of leaders; (9) high amplitude and
fluctuation of price changes; (10) elastic demand at the market price; (11) consistent levels
and patterns of profits; (12) basing-point pricing. Id. at 62-71.
Proving agreement by the use of economic evidence is also discussed in Kamerschen,
An Economic Approach to the Detection and Proof of Collusion, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 193
(1979); Markovits, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare
(pt. 3), 27 STAN. L. REv. 307 (1975); Comment, A StructuralApproach to the Application of
Section One of the Sherman Act to Oligopolistic Interdependence, 35 ME. L. REV. 181
(1983).
11 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 47.
" This description of economic analysis in antitrust courtrooms is found in United
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 n.10 (1972).
51 Posner himself accepts the proposition that economic evidence "frequently is ambig51
55
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Moreover, because Posner would retain the rule of per se illegality
for overt acts of conspiracy, 60 it is unlikely that plaintiffs would
abandon all efforts to uncover "smoking gun" evidence. Thus, it is
not clear that judicial economy would be enhanced under this twostep approach. Posner's position may also be criticized on the
ground that it might condemn, under section 1, firms that have
achieved a monopoly market price merely by considering their rivals' behavior in setting prices-a result that Turner finds both
contrary to the statute and unsound as a policy matter."'
Posner argues, however, that a firm that raises price and restricts output, with the mere expectation that other firms will do
the same, engages in a form of concerted action analogous to a unilateral contract.6 2 He admits that, if pressed too far, this approach
might condemn firms that do not in fact engage in anticompetitive
conduct-for example, those firms that consider the probable response of competitors in setting prices after a common cost increase. 3 Thus, Posner concludes that "the law should not always
equate tacit and explicit pricing agreements. 61 4 Tacit agreement is
objectionable and should be condemned only when its effect is to
limit output and raise prices above the competitive level.6 5
uous." Posner, supra note 3, at 910.
60 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 76. Posner states that he would apply this rule at least in
markets "that exhibit the predisposing characteristics toward collusion." Id.
6 Posner summarized his understanding of the differences between the Harvard and
Chicago Schools of antitrust in Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 925 (1979). He notes that while each accepts the conclusion, found in many
studies, that there is a positive correlation between concentration and profitability in an
industry, the two schools diverge over the reason for this correlation and thus over the appropriate legal response. Id. at 944. The Harvard School, Posner writes, "contends that the
correlation is explained by the fact that the leading firms in highly concentrated industries
employ 'conscious parallelism' to avoid price competition and thereby earn abnormal profits." Id. The Harvard School's response to this problem is to seek deconcentration of these
industries by breaking up the larger firms. Id. at 944-48.
The Chicago School, on the other hand, "does not deny that concentration is a factor
that facilitates collusion of a sort difficult to detect, although it attaches less significance to
concentration per se than do the oligopoly theorists." Id. at 944-45. Above-average profit
levels will either encourage new entry into the market, or if no entry is forthcoming, imply
that the market "simply does not have room for many firms" due to economies of scale in
production or consistent innovation by incumbents that new entrants cannot duplicate. Id.
at 945. In either case, "public intervention designed to change the market structure" is not
warranted. Id. "lAin orthodox Chicago position. . . had crystallized: only explicit price fixing and very large horizontal mergers (mergers to monopoly) were worthy of serious concern." Id. at 933.
62 R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 71-72.
63 Id. at 72.
64 Id.
65 Id.

Conscious Parallelismand Price Fixing

1985]

Although Posner and Turner address conscious parallelism
from different theoretical perspectives, they share the view that
section 1 enforcement should be concerned more with the effects of
parallel conduct in the market than with proving the traditional
elements of agreement. Both believe that it is important to examine markets in which parallel conduct occurs for indications of
anticompetitive conduct, and each advocates the examination of
66
parallel conduct under tests that are akin to the rule of reason.
Their analyses indicate that there are two principal questions
raised by the phenomenon of conscious parallelism: When may a
practice be said to reflect an agreement? And if it reflects an agreement, when should it be characterized as an agreement in restraint
of trade?
II.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM UNDER THE
SHERMAN ACT

Section 1 of the Sherman Act refers both to prohibited means
and to a prohibited end. 67 The means-"contract, combination or
conspiracy"-has been interpreted to require only some form of
"concerted action," rather than one of the three specified arrangements.68 Moreover, the agreement need not be formal-it may be
either "tacit or express. '6' The prohibited end-"restraint of
trade"-refers both to practices that, under rule-of-reason analy6"

This characterization has been made by the Federal Trade Commission, see infra

note 151 and accompanying text, and acknowledged by Posner himself when he noted the
"family resemblance" between his proposal and an earlier "rule of reason" standard proposed in Conant, Consciously ParallelAction in Restraint of Trade, 38 MINN. L. REV. 797
(1954). See Posner, supra note 49, at 1562 n.1.
6 "Section 1 specifies means as well as ends. Perhaps as a matter of public policy restraint of trade per se should be controlled but conspiracy is required in this case." Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199, 207-08 (3d Cir.
1961) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
"' As the Third Circuit has observed:
[T]he cases have interpreted the statute as "presenting a single concept about common
action, not three separate ones: 'contract ... combination or conspiracy' becomes an
alliterative compound noun, roughly translated to mean 'concerted action.' There is
little need to grapple with issues about the meanings of the particular words of the
statute nor to mark nice distinctions among them."
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 445-46 (3d Cir. 1977) (quoting L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 35, at 312), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); see also Wirtz, Purpose and Effect in
Sherman Act Conspiracies,57 WASH. L. REV. 1, 42 (1981) ("Perhaps the one generalization
the Supreme Court's decisions on this issue will support is that to make out a section 1
violation there must be proof of the kind of mutual assent suggested by the word

'agreement.'

').

"9 See Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[52:508

sis, are found to be anticompetitive in effect, 70 and to a limited
class of conduct that is treated as per se illegal because it is "conclusively presumed to be unreasonable. '71 In determining whether
to apply per se illegality, as well as in applying rule-of-reason analysis, "the inquiry is confined to a consideration of impact on competitive conditions. ' 7 2 In contrast to the rule of reason, there is no
7 3
defense to per se illegality once an agreement is demonstrated.
Price-fixing agreements, whether to raise, depress, fix, or stabilize a
commodity's price, are per se illegal regardless of their anticompe74
titive effects.
Conscious parallelism first emerged as a theory of antitrust liability in actions brought under section 5 of the Federal Trade
70 See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690
(1978). Professor, now Judge, Frank Easterbrook has criticized this formulation of the rule
of reason as "empty." Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1, 12 (1984). He
argues that the definition of the rule of reason currently employed by the courts is too vague
to offer useful guidance to judges. Id. He suggests as an alternative the use by courts of a
series of presumptions, based on economic theory, to aid in deciding whether conduct is
"anticompetitive." Id. at 14-39.
71 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Several categories of conduct have been labeled per se illegal, including (1) price-fixing, both vertical and horizontal;
(2) tying arrangements where a seller permits a buyer to purchase a desired item (the tying
product) over which the seller has market power only if the buyer also agrees to purchase a
second item (the tied product) from the seller; (3) group boycotts or concerted refusals to
deal; and (4) horizontal market divisions. See 2 JULIAN VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS &
TRADE REGULATION § 6.02[1] (1984). Nonetheless, the application of the per se rule to vertical price-fixing and tying arrangements has come under attack recently. See, e.g., ROBERT
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 372-74 (1978) (tying arrangements); Baker, Interconnected
Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the Section One Labyrinth: Is Sylvania a Way
Out?, 67 VA. L. REV. 1457, 1465-66 (1981) (vertical price restrictions). In Monsanto Co. v
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464, 1469 n.7 (1984), the Court took note of the arguments against application of the per se rule to vertical price fixing. Indeed, the Solicitor
General of the United States submitted an amicus brief urging the Court to reconsider the
rule. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner ,at 19-29,
Monsanto. The Court refused this invitation, however, see 104 S. Ct. at 1469 n.7, and decided the case on the evidentiary issues presented by the parties.
In Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1560-61 (1984), a bare
majority of the Court affirmed the application of the per se rule to tying arrangements in
cases in which the seller has market power over the tying product. But Justice O'Connor,
joined by three other members of the Court, argued that the per se rule should be scrapped.
Id. at 1570-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
72 See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978).

As one lower court explained: "The ultimate test of legality, of course, is whether the particular restraint promotes or impairs competition. But . . . the intent or purpose underlying
the restraint is a crucial variable in aiding the court to assess the competitive effects of the
restraint." Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72, 82-83 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
73 See R. BORK, supra note 71, at 66.
74 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24 (1940).
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Commission Act (FTCA). 5 The textual basis for this theory is
much stronger under the FTCA than under section 1 of the Sherman Act because section 5 does not include a concerted-action requirement.7" Commentators have suggested, however, that even in
early Sherman Act cases recognizing the doctrine, courts seemed to
equate conscious parallelism with agreement. 77 These decisions
permitted the inference of a price-fixing conspiracy without direct
evidence that a formal agreement to adopt parallel marketing practices had been reached. 78 In Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,79 however, the Supreme Court
held that conscious parallelism was not equivalent to agreement
for the purposes of section 1:
[B]usiness behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence
from which the fact finder may infer agreement. . . . But this
Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982) ("Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful."). See, e.g., Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175, 176 (7th Cir. 1948),
aff'd sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949). In Triangle Conduit, the
second count of the FTC's complaint, unlike the first count, did not allege an agreement,
but alleged a violation of section 5 "'through [the defendants'] concurrent use of a formula
method of making delivered price quotations with the knowledge that each did likewise,
with the result that price competition between and among them was unreasonably restrained.'" 168 F.2d at 176. The Seventh Circuit upheld the FTC's finding that these parallel practices, even absent an agreement among the parties, were an unfair method of competition under section 5 of the FTCA. Id. at 181. For a discussion of Triangle Conduit and its
implications for section 5 of the FTCA, see Note, Conscious Parallelismin the Use of Delivered Pricing Systems: A Modified Per Se Standard of Review Under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1194 (1981).
7' See Note, supra note 75, at 1203-11.
77 See Blechman, Conscious Parallelism, Signalling and Facilitating Devices: The
Problem of Tacit Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws, 24 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 881, 882-85
(1979); Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHL L.
REV. 567, 584 (1947) ("Parallel action based on acknowledged self-interest within a defined
market structure is sufficient evidence of illegal action.").
7' For example, in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), the
alleged conspiracy was between two Texas motion picture exhibitors and eight national film
distributors. Although the distributors met individually with the exhibitors, and each was
aware that the other seven had received identical letters from the film exhibitors proposing
the marketing changes that were eventually adopted, no evidence was offered that all eight
distributors ever met to discuss the new marketing procedures. In affirming the illegality of
the arrangement, the Supreme Court reasoned:
It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators. . . . Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is
.sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act.
Id. at 227 (citations omitted).
79 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
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conclusively establishes agreement or . . that such behavior
itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense. Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy
inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but "conscious parallelism" has not yet read conspiracy
out of the Sherman Act entirely 0
After Theatre Enterprises, lower courts have held that parallel conduct is sufficient evidence of agreement only when additional evidence, or "plus factors," is presented." The most consistently used plus factor is proof that the parallel practices were
contrary to each firm's apparent self-interest, 2 a fact that is usually established by examining whether there were any legitimate
business justifications for the conduct. Other plus factors include
high-level interfirm communication, 3 artificial standardization of
products,8 4 and price increases during times of low demand. 5
Under the "business justifications" test, courts have addressed
the propriety of a broad range of conduct that falls between the
80 Id. at 540-41 (citations and footnote omitted).

81See, e.g., Weit v. Continental III. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 462-63 (7th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982); Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199, 202-03 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962). The
term "plus factor" actually was employed before the Theatre Enterprises decision. See C0-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 497 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
892 (1952).
82 See, e.g., Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579, 583 (3d Cir. 1951) (conduct in "apparent contradiction to [each defendant's] own self-interest . . . strengthens considerably
the inference of conspiracy") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952). Taking
plus-factor analysis one step further, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the inference of conspiracy from parallel business behavior "might have been permissible in the absence of evidence showing that their respective actions were prompted by some fact other than mutual
understanding or agreement." Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,
322 F.2d 656, 661 (9th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963). Numerous
decisions have held that the inference of conspiracy from parallel conduct is permissible
"where the pattern of action undertaken is inconsistent with the self-interest of the individual actors, were they acting alone." Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d
877, 884 (8th Cir. 1978); accord Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 327
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982); Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632
F.2d 539, 559 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981); Modern Home Inst., Inc. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 513 F.2d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 1975).
83 See, e.g., In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 633-34 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
dismissed sub nom. Lyman Lamb v. Weyerhauser, 462 U.S. 1125 (1983); Gainesville Util.
Dep't v. Florida Power & Light Co., 573 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966
(1978).
84 See C-0-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 497 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952).
85 See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 805 (1946); C-0-Two Fire
Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 497 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952).
For a list of additional plus factors, see Blechman, supra note 77, at 885-87.
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two extremes (formal cartel and monopolistic competition) that
may constitute concerted action. In accord with the view of the
Harvard School that firms recognize and act upon their mutual interdependence, courts have held that "[s]imilarity of prices in the
sale of standardized products . . . will not alone make out a prima
facie case of collusive price-fixing," 8 6 and that price leadership, 7
standing alone, does not constitute an agreement in restraint of
trade.88 Industry-wide adoption of such mechanisms as delivered 9
and two-tiered pricing,9 0 however, has been deemed sufficient to
support the inference of agreement.9 1
Courts have differed over the meaning of "conduct against
self-interest" under the business-justifications test. The general
standard, which requires "'a showing of acts by defendants in con86 FTC v. Lukens Steel Co., 454 F. Supp. 1182, 1190 n.9 (D.D.C. 1978); accord Weit v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 463 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 988 (1982); Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656,
665 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963). The Lukens court noted that "price identity may be the expected and normal result when the product is identical or fungible, even
though there is no agreement and the costs for the participating companies are not the
same." 454 F. Supp. at 1190.
87 Price leadership is an industry practice in which one firm's pricing movements are
followed by its rivals. See P. AscH, supra note 28, at 66-69.
88 "An accidental or incidental price uniformity, or even 'pure' conscious parallelism of
prices is, standing alone, not unlawful. Nor is an individual competitor's sole decision to
follow a price leadership, standing alone, a violation of law." Esco Corp. v. United States,
340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965); see also United States v. International Harvester Co.,
274 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1927) ("[T]he fact that competitors may see proper, in the exercise of
their own judgment, to follow the prices of another manufacturer, does not establish any
suppression of competition or show any sinister domination.") (citations omitted).
88 In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 631-32, 634 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed sub nom. Lyman Lamb v. Weyerhauser, 462 U.S. 1125 (1983).
10 Ambook Enters. v. Time Inc., 612 F.2d 604, 611-18 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. dismissed,
448 U.S. 914 (1980).
1 In establishing the existence of conscious parallelism, a showing of exact uniformity
of action is not required. Nevertheless, "more than a general similarity of action" must be
shown. Harlem River Consumers Coop., Inc. v. Associated Grocers, 408 F. Supp. 1251, 1277
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); see also Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297
F.2d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 1961) (requiring only "uniformity of action on a crucial point"), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
Courts have not articulated the reason for this distinction, although the Ninth Circuit
has indicated that "'pure' conscious parallelism of prices is, standing alone, not unlawful."
Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965). This suggests a difference
in treatment consistent with the theory of monopolistic competition. Chamberlin theorized
that once monopolistic competitors recognized their interdependence, they would, without
communication, set prices at the monopoly level. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying
text. Conduct beyond such "pure parallelism," such as the adoption of practices that facilitate coordination to reach the monopoly price, would be unnecessary and cannot be explained as the expected result of monopolistic competition.
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tradiction of their own economic interests,' "92 is particularly unhelpful. Economists assume that a firm always acts in its own perceived self-interest,9 3 and there is no apparent reason why a court
should reject this assumption. Moreover, it is in a firm's interest to
maximize profits by entering into a cartel arrangement. A firm
could therefore argue unabashedly that any practice that increases
prices, including a cartel, would also further the firm's own interests by increasing its profits.
A more useful rule, which has been adopted by several courts,
avoids these difficulties by allowing the inference of agreement
"[o]nly where the pattern of action undertaken is inconsistent with
the self-interest of the individual actors, were they acting alone."9 4
This test meshes well with cartel theory, which suggests that group
action contrary to each firm's independent profit-maximizing conduct is needed in order to attain a monopoly price. 95

92

Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977) (quoting Venzie Corp. v.

United States Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1314 (3d. Cir. 1975)), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978).

See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 15, at 141-43.
Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 884 (8th Cir. 1978); see
also Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 327 (D.C. Cir.) (agreement may
be inferred "[o]nly when the observed parallel behavior is inconsistent with the behavior to
be expected from each actor individually pursuing its own economic interest"), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 839 (1982); Modern Home Inst., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 513 F.2d
102, 111 (2d Cir. 1975) (basis for inference of conspiracy may be actions that are in one's
self-interest only if done in concert with others).
91 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. The business justifications proffered
by firms have been as varied as the products they sell. In Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982), three justifications were offered by the defendant commercial banks in response to the plaintiffs' claim
that the industry-wide 1.5% per month interest fee on an inter-bank charge card system
was the product of a price-fixing conspiracy: each of the banks had parallel costs for operating their charge card systems; each had "identical problems of fraud, credit losses, and large
initial expense, to which reasonable businessmen would react in the same fashion"; and,
1.5% was the rate then charged on other consumer credit cards. 641 F.2d at 461. The Seventh Circuit found that these explanations were sufficient to preclude the inference of unlawful conspiracy, despite evidence that the banks had adopted the inter-bank system at the
same time and had met frequently to discuss its operation. Id. at 463.
In Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 839 (1982), several automobile repair shops alleged that five insurance companies had
conspired to fix the price of automobile damage repair work. The repair shops offered evidence of parallel conduct that included the use of the same labor rate in writing estimates,
similar arrangements with repair shops that agreed to do volume work at lower rates, use of
surveys of repair shops to determine the average rate charged by shops in particular areas,
and a tendency to resist price increases by repair shops. 675 F.2d at 311, 330. The court
found that these practices did not support an inference of conspiracy because they served
the economic self-interest of each insurance company by reducing the costs o; automobile
repair. Id. at 330. The court observed that surveys are a means of locating low-price repair
shops. Id. Similarly, the use of repair shops willing to charge rates set by insurance compa"
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The most elaborate formulation of the test, however, was provided by the Third Circuit in Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Products Co.,9 6 where the court synthesized from prior decisions a two-pronged test for permitting the inference of agreement
from conscious parallelism: there must be (1) a showing of acts by
defendants in contradiction of their own economic interests and
(2) a satisfactory demonstration of motivation to enter into an
agreement.97 The "Venzie test" is based upon the observation that
business behavior does not permit the inference of agreement "unless the circumstances under which it occurred make the inference
of rational, independent choice less attractive than that of concerted action."9 "
The Venzie test differs from standards developed by other
courts because it requires proof that there was a motive to conspire.9 9 The motive for entering into a price-fixing arrangement is
usually straightforward-the higher cartel price allows a firm to
capture a share of the monopoly profits. The motive element of the
Venzie test, however, is not designed to show why a cartel might
have been formed. Rather, it is used to demonstrate that an individual firm was in a position to benefit from specified concerted
action. 10 0 As the Supreme Court has suggested, the motive analysis
may provide an escape by way of a summary judgment for defendants who have adopted industry-wide parallel business practices,
but who nonetheless have nothing to gain from the alleged
agreement. 10 1

hies in exchange for volume referrals is also in the self-interest of each insurance company
since it reduces costs. Id. at 331-33.
99521 F.2d 1309 (3d Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 1314; see also Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205
(3d Cir. 1980) (using the same approach); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d
Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
98 Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1086 (1978).
99 See, e.g., Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 559 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981); Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d
877, 884 (8th Cir. 1978).
100 See First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 287 (1968), where, in discussing its prior decision in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), the
Court wrote: "The reason that the absence of direct evidence of agreement ... was not
fatal is that the distributors all had the same motive to enter into a tacit agreement." Presumably that motive was greater profits from monopoly prices.
101See First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 287 (1968). In fact, the Supreme Court in Cities Service upheld a dismissal from an action alleging a concerted refusal
to deal on a motion for summary judgment for lack of motive. Id. at 287-88. For a discussion
of the appropriate test for weighing competing inferences drawn from the independent selfinterest test for a summary judgment motion, see Note, Conscious Parallelism:The Busi-
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An example of this use of the motive inquiry is Japanese
Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation,' where one of the defendants, Sony, was granted summary judgment on charges of engaging in a price-fixing conspiracy with other Japanese television
manufacturers, on the ground that no motive to conspire had been
shown. 103 The plaintiffs, American television manufacturers, had
asserted that the Japanese defendants had conspired to raise
prices in their domestic market and to dump televisions in the
United States at below-cost prices. 04 Although Sony had engaged
in the practice of selling television sets in the United States at
prices significantly below the prices charged in Japan for comparable sets, the Third Circuit found that, unlike the other defendants,
Sony did not compete in the low-price segment of the market
where the plaintiffs sold their televisions. 10 5 The court thus held
that "[a]bsent some evidence suggesting. . . a motive [to join the
conspiracy] the remaining evidence is entirely
too speculative to
0 6
support a prima facie case against Sony.'
One problem that arises under the second prong of the Venzie
test is identifying what motives would be sufficient to defeat a defendant's motion for summary judgment. For example, the required motive could be a desire to earn monopoly profits, or it
might only be some less objectionable interest, such as a desire to
cultivate good business relations with the cartel. Perhaps any poness Judgment Defense in a Summary Judgment Context, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 115 (1983).
The Seventh Circuit has found the similarities between the per se test employed under
section 1 conspiracy-to-fix-prices and group-boycott cases sufficient to warrant application
of the Cities Service standard in the former. Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 641 F.2d 457, 465 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982).
102 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 105 S. Ct. 1863 (1985).
103 723 F.2d at 313.
104 Id.
at 305-06. Among the practices alleged were agreements that each manufacturer
would confine itself to sales to five companies in the United States (i.e., market division),
secret rebates to retailers, and sales at prices that produced losses. The Third Circuit held
that a trier of fact could infer that the Japanese had a strong motive to sell their product at
low prices because they had higher fixed costs, providing an incentive to use manufacturing
capacity at the highest possible levels. The fact that Japanese manufacturers are expected
to maintain the "permanence and stability of their workforce" was cited as one source of the
higher fixed costs. Id. at 307.
205 Id. at 313.
100 Id. Another defendant, Sears Roebuck, was also dismissed on summary judgment

despite evidence that it had solicited and then concealed from the Japanese and United
States governments dumping prices (in apparent contradiction to its own interest as a onefourth owner of an American television manufacturer). Id. at 312-13. Because the solicitation of low prices was consistent with Sears' economic interest as a retailer, the court held
"that circumstance is so slightly probative of a motive to join a conspiracy as, on this record,
to be valueless." Id. at 312.
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tential benefit to the defendant, no matter how slight, should be
enough. But if the motive requirement is read too broadly, the
benefits of judicial economy accruing from the test would disappear; a broad reading would also increase the risk that firms who
have not in fact colluded will be held liable for price fixing. Thus,
plaintiffs must be required to suggest a plausible motive to collude
on the part of each defendant that is of "such importance that
7
10
[they] would risk possible antitrust liability.'

The Venzie formulation of the business-justifications test is an
appropriate starting point for analyzing parallel practices because
it screens out mere parallel pricing, behavior that is consistent
with "natural" monopolistic competition, and because it requires,
as a first approximation, some indication of interdependence
among firms that may rise to the level of concerted action. In this
sense, it meets the concerns of the Harvard School, which suggests
that behavior that is consistent with monopolistic competition in
its pure form should not, by itself, be a basis for finding
8
agreement.

10

The Venzie test alone, however, may be inadequate for conclusively determining liability under section 1. The test is aimed
solely at finding agreement, not at identifying parallel conduct that
is anticompetitive; section 1, however, requires not only agreement,
but also a restraint of trade-that is, an anticompetitive effect-as
a consequence of the agreement. Furthermore, the theories of both
the Chicago and Harvard Schools suggest that the validity of coordinated conduct going beyond "pure" pricing practices does not
depend on whether independent business justifications exist; it
must also be shown that the market does not behave as it would be
expected to behave under "normal" competitive conditions. 1 9 Only
if tacit collusion is found to go beyond the making of interdependent pricing decisions, so that the practice actually facilitates price
fixing, should it fall within the proscription of section 1.
By ending the inquiry after agreement has been found, the
Venzie test, and similar tests currently used by most courts, implicitly incorporates the conclusion that all agreements to engage
in parallel pricing practices are anticompetitive: such agreements
are treated as anticompetitive, and hence illegal, per se. 0 The reFTC v. Lukens Steel Co., 454 F. Supp. 1182, 1197 n.18 (D.D.C. 1978).
supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
109 See supra notes 44-48, 62-65 and accompanying text.
110 See cases cited supra note 9. It might be argued that the motive prong of the Venzie
test precludes the need for a rule-of-reason analysis. But while evidence of the purpose be107

108 See
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mainder of this comment will examine the propriety of the per se
rule and will show that such an approach should be rejected in
favor of a rule-of-reason analysis as a supplement to the businessjustifications test.
III.

IDENTIFYING RESTRAINTS OF TRADE: INDEPENDENT BUSINESS
JUSTIFICATIONS AND THE RULE OF REASON

A. Per Se Rule Versus Rule-of-Reason Analysis
At first blush, it may appear that per se illegality, rather than
rule-of-reason analysis,"' should govern cases in which a tacit
agreement is proved; this would accord with precedent suggesting
that naked price-fixing agreements, even those among small firms
without market power, are illegal." 2 As the Supreme Court rehind a practice may buttress a finding that the practice impairs competition, it is not by
itself sufficient to support this conclusion. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. As the
Supreme Court has stressed, "the purpose of the [rule-of-reason] analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint." National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (emphasis added). Moreover, the motive
requirement of the Venzie test is intended as a procedural device to screen out those parties
that could have no relevant reason for entering a conspiracy of the type alleged. A showing
of a possible motive does no more than to keep a party in the case. It does not prove that
the party had the anticompetitive purpose that is an element of the substantive offense. Cf.
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 29 (1972) (arguing that in the criminal law, intent, but not motive, is relevant in substantive issues while motive is relevant in
procedural matters, such as the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to invoke the criminal process).
"I As the Supreme Court explained:
The [rule of reason] test prescribed in [Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
58 (1911),] is whether the challenged contracts or acts "were unreasonably restrictive of
competitive conditions." Unreasonableness under that test could be based either (1) on
the nature or character of the contracts, or (2) on surrounding circumstances giving rise
to the inference or presumption that they were intended to restrain trade and enhance
prices. Under either branch of the test, the inquiry is confined to a consideration of
impact on competitive conditions.
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978) (footnote
omitted). See also Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), where the
Court noted that it must
consiaer the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained,
are all relevant facts.
For discussion of a proposal to discard per se analysis for all price-fixing cases, see
Note, Fixing the Price Fixing Confusion: A Rule of Reason Approach, 92 YALE L.J. 706
(1983).
112 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24 (1940); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1365 (5th Cir. 1980).
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cently emphasized in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System," 3 however, not all agreements to fix prices are
subject to the per se rule.""
As a preliminary matter, a court must determine whether the
challenged conduct properly falls within the ambit of the per se
rule." 5 The inquiry, however, must transcend the facts of any particular case. The court must look to the class of conduct generally,
not as it manifests itself in a particular market. As the Court noted
in Broadcast Music, "[t]he scrutiny . . . must not merely subsume
the burdensome analysis required under the rule of reason . . . or
else we should apply the rule of reason from the start.""'
In making this generalized inquiry, the court must first balance "[t]he probability that anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the severity of those consequences . . .
against its procompetitive consequences."'' Application of the per
se rule reflects a judgment that the instances in which the challenged form of conduct is actually procompetitive are so rare or
unimportant that it is not worth expending judicial resources to
determine whether a particular instance of the practice is indeed
procompetitive." s But, as the Court stated in Broadcast Music, it
is only "after considerable experience with the type of challenged
restraint" that courts classify them as per se violations." 9 Thus, if
the courts are uncertain about the competitive effect of a practice,

...441 U.S. 1 (1979).
,, As generally used in the antitrust field, "price-fixing" is a shorthand way of describ-

ing certain categories of business behavior to which the per se rule has been held applicable. . . .Literalness is overly simplistic and often overbroad. When two partners set
the price of their goods or services they are literally "price fixing," but they are not per
se in violation of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 9.
"I [T]he existence of a per se rule should not, and logically cannot, preclude a court
from determining whether the per se rule should be applied. The applicability of the
per se rule is not an issue that is foreclosed by the existence of a per se rule. If the
characteristics of a case are so different from previous per se cases that the substantive
policy embodied in the per se rule is no longer applicable, the rule should not be
applied.
Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of the Chicago
School, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 319, 327.
"' 441 U.S. at 19 n.33 (citation omitted); cf. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147,
1155 (10th Cir. 1983) ("[In assessing the facial validity of an integration, courts are not to
engage in rule of reason analysis."), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
"1 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
"I See id.
"' 441 U.S. at 19 n.33; see also United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08
(1972); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1051 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 156 (1983).
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the per se rule is not applied. 120
Another precondition for applying the per se rule is that it
give clear "guidance to the business community" and reduce "the
burdens on litigants and the judicial system of more complex ruleof-reason trials. '121 These advantages do not accompany every application of the per se rule, however, and even when they do, they
have been held to be insufficient, by themselves, to justify the per
22
se approach.
Furthermore, the Court stated in Broadcast Music that a
practice should be condemned as per se illegal only when it is
clear, without engaging iri an elaborate inquiry, that the practice is
"one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output." 2 3 In Broadcast Music itself, the Court
refused to apply the per se rule to a price-fixing agreement in
which it was uncertain whether the intent or effect of the agreement was to restrain competition.' 2 4
Under this generalized inquiry, tacit agreement inferred from

120 See United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1365 (5th Cir. 1980); see

also Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1053 (9th Cir.) (where
effect on competition "is equivocal, it is appropriate to examine the purpose of the restraint
in deciding whether to apply the per se rule"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 156 (1983); United
States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[Pierse
rules risk sweeping reasonable, procompetitive activity within a general condemnation, and
a court will run this risk only where dictated on the basis of unambiguous experience.").
21 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
122 United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1365 (5th Cir. 1980). The
per se rule often reduces litigation costs because it proscribes conduct without regard to
actual effect, thus saving the often monumental expense of investigating the economic structure of an entire industry. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (per
se rule avoids "the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries").
122 441 U.S. at 19-20.
12 Broadcast Music involved an arrangement between music composers and two firms,
ASCAP and BMI, that allowed the firms to negotiate with music consumers for a blanket
license for performing rights to all of the composers' copyrighted works. BMI and ASCAP
refused to grant performance rights for individual scores, but the music consumer had the
option of negotiating with each composer. 441 U.S. at 6. While the agreement literally involved price fixing-the composers and publishing houses had joined together into an organization that set its price for the blanket license-the Court held that it was not per se illegal.
Id. at 9, 20. The Court found that the challenged arrangement might be procompetitive
because it facilitated the integration of sales and the monitoring of, and enforcement
against, unauthorized use of the composers' works. Id. at 13, 21. The blanket license, the
Court found, "is a necessary consequence of the integration necessary to achieve these efficiencies, and a necessary consequence is that its price must be established." Id. at 21. While
demonstrated efficiency alone "might not remove a naked price-fixing scheme from the ambit of the per se rule . . . here we are uncertain whether the practice on its face has the
effect, or could have been spurred by the purpose, of restraining competition among the
individual composers." Id. at 13.

19851

Conscious Parallelismand Price Fixing

parallel behavior under the business-justifications test should not
be considered per se illegal, for several reasons. First, economic
theory suggests that informal agreement cannot be successful except in the context of oligopoly. 12 5 As the number of participating

firms increases, it becomes impossible to detect violations and enforce the agreement. The resulting incentive for each member to
undercut the agreed-upon monopoly price, without fear of sanction, soon leads to complete erosion of the monopoly price.126
Thus, it simply cannot be said that tacit collusion would almost
always tend to restrict competition.
Second, the Venzie test can lead to an inference that the parties have agreed to adopt parallel conduct that may affect price.
But this inference is permitted only after an examination of the
business justifications-an examination that usually entails the
very kind of elaborate inquiry that the Court suggests should preclude use of the per se rule. 27 Furthermore, nothing in the test
itself supports the further inference that a particular parallel practice has anticompetitive effects. Thus, conclusively presuming such
effects on the basis of the test violates the admonition in Broadcast Music against casually assuming that all agreements affecting
28
price are illegal price-fixing agreements.
Third, the market consequences of many parallel business
See supra notes 18-19, 26-27 and accompanying text.
There is no consensus among economists about the level of concentration above
which collusion becomes an attractive proposition. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 55-56. Concentration levels interact with other market factors to create suitable conditions for successful collusion. Id.
37 The classic statement of the rationale behind per se illegality is found in Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958): "[T]here are certain agreements or practices
which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as
to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."
Analysis of independent business justifications under the Venzie test is an example of
such an "elaborate inquiry." In Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551
(1984), Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, argued on similar grounds that the per se
rule against product-tying arrangements should be abandoned:
The "per se" doctrine in tying cases has. . . always required an elaborate inquiry into
the economic effects of the tying arrangement. As a result, tying doctrine incurs the
costs of a rule of reason approach without achieving its benefits: the doctrine calls for
the extensive and time-consuming economic analysis characteristic of the rule of reason, but then may be interpreted to prohibit arrangements that economic analysis
would show to be beneficial. Moreover, the per se label in the tying context has generated more confusion than coherent law because it appears to invite lower courts to omit
the analysis of economic circumstances of the tie that has always been a necessary
element of tying analysis.
Id. at 1570 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
32' See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
325
32
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practices are ambiguous. For example, delivered pricing may facilitate collusion by standardizing shipping charges and making it easier to maintain a cartel price. Without delivered pricing, a firm
could effectively cut price by offering lower freight charges rather
than a lower product price-a practice that would disguise cheating. 129 But delivered pricing may also be procompetitive. When
freight costs constitute a small percentage of the price of the delivered product, it may be more efficient to charge all buyers the
same price and avoid the expense of determining individual freight
charges. Moreover, delivered pricing may be adopted because customers wish to avoid the risk of price fluctuations due to freight
cost variations. 3 0 Thus, it cannot be concluded that the instances
in which parallel conduct is actually procompetitive are so rare or
unimportant that the savings in judicial resources resulting from
the application of the per se rule justify the risk of error. 31
B.

A Two-Step Approach

These considerations show that it is improper to apply the per
se rule in cases of tacit collusion, or to rely solely on the businessjustifications test to determine the validity of such practices under
section 1. In order to show both agreement and restraint of trade,
parallel practices should be examined under a two-pronged inquiry-first, the business-justifications test, and second, rule-ofreason analysis.
Under the first prong of this approach, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by proving conscious parallelism and
suggesting a motive for the defendants to collude. The burden of
coming forward with evidence that the conduct would have been in
129

Carlton, A Reexamination of Delivered Pricing Systems, 26 J.L. & ECON. 51, 53

(1983).
30

Id. at 65.

Furthermore, some courts have shown little zeal to impose liability for tacit agreement to fix prices without some proof that the parallel conduct has an adverse effect on the
market. See Givens, ParallelBusiness Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 5 ANTITRUST BULL.
273, 282-87 (1960). For example, in Ambook Enters. v. Time Inc., 612 F.2d 604 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 914 (1980), Judge Friendly, characterizing an agreement to
establish a dual-rate system in the print advertising industry as a concerted refusal to deal
rather than price fixing, advised the district court on remand to examine the reasonableness
of the practice. 612 F.2d at 618 n.23. The per se rule creates a temptation for judges to
classify conduct as something other than price fixing-such as an information exchange or a
refusal to deal-in order to avoid a harsh result. See Note, supra note 111, at 722-25. The
rule of reason for tacit price-fixing conspiracies must be recognized formally by the courts in
order to allow practitioners to prepare and present evidence adequately. This would both
promote judicial economy and provide a more certain, though a more searching, standard by
''

which business practices are tested.
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the self-interest of each firm, were it acting alone, then shifts to
the defendants. The plaintiff has the ultimate burden of showing
that no defendant would have engaged in the parallel conduct unless all did. 1 32 If the plaintiff-successfully meets this burden, tacit
agreement is not proved but is a permissible inference for the trier
133
of fact.
Under the second prong of the test-the rule-of-reason inquiry-courts may find useful analogies to conduct examined
under section 2 of the Sherman Act,134 which, like this phase of the
analysis, also focuses on finding adverse market effects rather than
evidence of collusion. For example, if the defendants collectively
do not have market power, even a formal agreement would be unsuccessful in affecting the market price. 5
Recent decisions arising out of litigation in two industries-southern plywood and lead anti-knock compounds for gasoline-show that some courts have begun to move toward such a
two-step approach. These decisions also illustrate the merits of the
approach and the inadequacy of the alternatives.
In Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC,136 the Federal Trade Commission challenged the defendant plywood producers' use of a "West
Coast freight factor" in setting plywood prices. This factor was
used in establishing a "delivered zone price" that consisted of two
elements, an "index price" and freight; the "delivered zone price"
was uniform throughout an entire geographic zone. 3 7 Using a system adopted from the more established West Coast plywood industry, the southern plywood producers calculated the freight ele"I1See Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 460-61 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982).
'3 The inference is strengthened if the "participants are many and if they comprise a
non-oligopolistic industry, where the economic pressures forcing action and reaction with
competitors are absent." Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297
F.2d 199, 203 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
"3 Courts have frequently analogized sections 1 and 2. See Mid-Texas Communications
Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1389 n.13 (5th Cir.) ("It is clear . . . that
the analysis under section 2 is similar to that under section 1 regardless whether the rule of
reason label is applied per se."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); see also California Computer Prods., Inc. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1979)
("The defendant's acts [in a § 2 monopolization claim] are properly analyzed analogously to
contracts, combinations and conspiracies under § 1 of the Sherman Act."). But see Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S.Ct. 2731, 2740 (1984) ("Concerted activity subject to § 1 is judged more sternly than unilateral activity under § 2.").
131See Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1157 (10th Cir. 1983), afl'd, 104 S.
Ct. 2948 (1984).
637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 573-74.
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ment of each delivered price according to the cost of shipping the
plywood by rail from the West Coast, although it was actually
shipped by truck from the southern production points. 3 '
The Ninth Circuit held that these practices violated neither
section 5 of the FTCA nor, by analogy, section 1 of the Sherman
Act.13 9 The court found no evidence in the record that such delivered pricing had an anticompetitive effect, 14 0 noting that the FTC
had cited no evidence to disprove the "common sense proposition"
that southern producers continued to adjust the total price-by
varying the index price-to reflect locational or other trade advantages. 14 ' The court concluded that the "bare existence of an industry-wide artificial freight factor" was not a section 5 violation because it was not "utilized, tacitly or overtly, to match prices and
'
avoid price competition. 112
Even if agreement could be inferred
from parallel conduct, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, it must be
shown that "the challenged pricing system has actually had the effect of fixing or stabilizing prices. . . .[P]arallel behavior, without
more, does not trigger the per se treatment which is given to overt
43
agreement.'
Although the Ninth Circuit did not reach the issue of whether
there was an agreement among the defendants, it did assert the
need in such cases to look "for at least tacit agreement to use a
formula which has the effect of fixing prices. 1' 4 4 Thus, the court's
analytical framework is precisely that of the two-step approach advocated here: there must be evidence of a tacit agreement, and
there must be evidence of anticompetitive conduct."'
:38Id.
39

at 577-78.

Id. at 581.

Id.
Id. at 579-80 ("[T]he existence of substantial bargaining in the base price of plywood provides at least a prima facie inference that competition has not been affected by the
use of West Coast freight. The Commission has proved no substantial evidence to rebut that
inference.").
142 Id. at 576-77, 581.
143 Id. at 577-81.
144 Id. at 576.
45 In In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed sub
nom. Lyman Lamb v. Weyerhauser, 462 U.S. 1125 (1983), the Fifth Circuit held that this
same parallel practice "plus the numerous items of direct evidence of communication between high-level personnel on pricing policy" were sufficient for the jury to find a pricefixing conspiracy. 655 F.2d at 634. The jury had found that the plaintiffs were damaged by
this practice because "west coast freight" exceeded actual freight charges from southern
shipping points. Id. at 631-32. The trial court did not allow the producers to raise the business-justifications defense, see Brief of Petitioners Weyerhauser Company and Willamette
Industries, Inc. at 43-44, Lyman Lamb, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's jury
instructions, 655 F.2d at 637-38.
140

141
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If the court had applied the business-justifications test alone,
it might well have arrived at a different conclusion. The defendants may not have been persuasive in asserting reasons for the
use of West Coast freight consistent with their independent selfinterest. The Ninth Circuit noted that the plywood producers had
urged buyer preference as a business justification: the use of the
West Coast price index promoted "ready price comparison between western and southern plywood. ' 14 6 In discussing this assertion, however, the court sounded a note of skepticism by stating
that "plywood middlemen [who used the quoting system] arguably
would have little stake in an artificially imposed but uniform addition to price that could readily be passed on to the [ultimate] consumer." 147 The court's discussion demonstrates that, without ruleof-reason analysis in addition to the business-justifications test,
the southern plywood pricing practice might have been condemned
even though the evidence suggested that it did not impair
competition.
In contrast, the rule-of-reason inquiry by itself would have
condemned, and the business-justifications test by itself would
have exonerated, parallel practices involving the lead anti-knock
48
compound market. In E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC,1
the FTC had condemned three practices employed by the only
four producers of lead anti-knock gasoline additive: (1) the sale of
the product by all four firms at a delivered price that included
transportation costs; (2) the giving of extra advance notice of price
increases by two of the producers, over and above the thirty days
provided by contract; and (3) the use by three of the producers of
a "most favored nation" clause under which the seller promised
that no customer would be charged a higher price than other customers. 4 9e The Second Circuit vacated the FTC's order and found
146 637 F.2d at 578. For an economic discussion of delivered pricing in light of the plywood cases, see Carlton, supra note 129.
147 637 F.2d at 580. This skepticism is well founded. The plywood producers claimed
that the use of West Coast freight made price comparison easier for the purchaser who,
knowing that the freight element of the delivered price would be identical whether shipped
from the West or the South, would simply need to compare the index prices quoted by the
various producers. Id. at 574 n.1. Even this system is cumbersome, however, when compared with a delivered-price system where a consumer is quoted the price of a product delivered to the doorstep. After all, the consumer is interested in relative final prices, including product price and delivery costs. Under such a system, found in several industries, see
Carlton, supra note 129, at 52-53, there is no need for the consumer to do any calculations
to determine relative final prices. It seems unlikely that the "index plus West Coast freight"
pricing system would remain were one firm to price plywood in this greatly simplified form.
148 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
"4 The FTC's opinion, In re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425, 592 (1983), is summarized by
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that these practices did not violate section 5 of the FTCA. 5 0
The FTC did not claim that these practices were the result of
any express or tacit agreement. Instead, it relied solely on a ruleof-reason analysis that, as the FTC noted, is similar to the approaches advocated by Posner and Turner. 5 ' The FTC had reasoned that section 5 could be violated "even in the absence of
agreement if the firms engage in interdependent conduct that, because of the market structure and conditions, facilitates price coordination in a way that substantially lessens competition in the
15 2
industry.' 1
The Second Circuit found, however, that each producer had
legitimate, independent business reasons for the challenged practices. 153 Moreover, it denied thatthe FTC had power to condemn
practices by oligopolists, even under section 5, without some showing of tacit agreement, evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose, or the absence of independent and legitimate business rea54
sons for the conduct.1
The court stated that the FTC's rule-of-reason approach to oligopoly pricing left the law "in a state of complete unpredictability.' 55 A business would be required to review constantly not only
its own conduct, but also the conduct of competitors and the reaction of each to the other-all in an effort to avoid conduct that
cumulatively leads to supracompetitive prices. 5 6 Instead, "[a] line
must . . . be drawn between conduct that is anticompetitive and
' 57
legitimate conduct that has an impact on competition.'
These two cases illustrate why it is inadequate either to apply
the business-justifications test alone (with the implicit per se rule
for practices that fail the test) or the rule-of-reason analysis alone
(as suggested by Posner and Turner). The rule-of-reason inquiry
fails because it makes no attempt to define the line "between conthe Second Circuit in Du Pont, 729 F.2d at 130. The industry was a "natural oligopoly,"
exhibiting high concentration, small likelihood of new entries because of a sharply declining
market for leaded gasoline, inelastic demand, and homogeneity of the product. Id. at 132.
150 729 F.2d at 141-42. As the Second Circuit explained, the FTC may enforce both the
Sherman and Clayton Acts under section 5 of the FTCA. Id. at 136. Nevertheless, the FTC
"is not confined to their letter. It may bar incipient violations of those statutes." Id.; see
also FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321-22 (1966); FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953).
:61 In re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425, 599-602 (1983).
52

729 F.2d at 135.

M

Id. at 134-35, 140.

:5

Id. at 139-40.

55 Id. at 139.
I" Id.

157 Id. at 137-38.
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duct that is anticompetitive and legitimate conduct that has an
impact on competition." The business-justifications test draws the
line, but by itself does not determine whether the conduct has the
requisite "impact on competition." These issues can only be properly addressed by applying both the conduct-oriented business-justifications test and the impact-oriented rule-of-reason inquiry.
CONCLUSION

Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act requires both concerted action and restraint of trade before a challenged business
practice becomes unlawful. Because parallel conduct cannot properly be treated as per se anticompetitive, the courts' application of
the business-justifications test to parallel conduct without a ruleof-reason inquiry for anticompetitive effects is contrary to the purpose of section 1 of the Sherman Act and to the Supreme Court's
decision in BroadcastMusic. Conversely, the approaches of Posner
and Turner, which focus solely on anticompetitive effects, expose
firms to liability for conduct that would not violate section 1 absent its interaction with the conduct of other competitors. Courts
examining parallel conduct under section 1 should require a showing both that there is an agreement among competitors and that
the challenged conduct has an anticompetitive impact on the
market.
Michael K. Vaska

